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Abstract
Cryptocurrencies gain trust in users by publicly disclosing the full creation and
transaction history. In return, the transaction history faithfully records the
whole spectrum of cryptocurrency user behaviors. This article analyzes and
summarizes the existing research on knowledge discovery in the cryptocurrency
transactions using data mining techniques. Specifically, we classify the exist-
ing research into three aspects, i.e., transaction tracings and blockchain address
linking, the analyses of collective user behaviors, and the study of individual user
behaviors. For each aspect, we present the problems, summarize the methodolo-
gies, and discuss major findings in the literature. Furthermore, an enumeration
of transaction data parsing and visualization tools and services is also provided.
Finally, we outline several future directions in this research area, such as the
current rapid development of Decentralized Finance (De-Fi) and digital fiat
money.
Keywords: cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, Ethereum, transaction analysis, data
mining, complex network
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1. Introduction
As of 2020, more than 7 000 cryptocurrencies are actively trading in more
than 20 000 online exchanges. Their total market capitalization has exceeded
USD 300 billion [1]. Although the cryptocurrencies are not backed by any
tangible assets, they gain trusts from users by publicly disclosing the full creation
and transaction history in peer-to-peer blockchain networks.
Each transaction in the blockchain consists of transferring a virtual value
from a virtual identity, i.e., a blockchain address or a set of addresses, to an-
other. The sizes of transaction records are quickly expanding. As of 2020, the
total transaction volumes of Bitcoin and Ethereum (the top two cryptocurren-
cies by market capitalization) have exceeded 500 million [2] and 600 million
[3], respectively. These transaction histories, although technically challenging
in extracting, transforming, and analyzing, have given us an unprecedented op-
portunity to study the panorama of human behavior in a complex economic
environment.
Reid and Harrigan [4] conducted the first study on the entire cryptocurrency
transaction history (up to mid-2011) and revealed emerging structure from in the
Bitcoin flow network and demonstrated the transaction history’s forensic capa-
bilities. Since then, the data mining from cryptocurrency transactions has grown
into a large body of research and been successfully applied in assisting multi-
ple law enforcement actions, including ceasing the then-largest darknet market
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Silk Road in 2013 [5] and arresting suspects in a major theft from the then-
largest cryptocurrency exchange Mt. Gox in 2017 [6]. To date, cryptocurrency
transaction analysis, also called blockchain analysis, has become an essential
means in fighting drug trafficking, computer network hacking, money launder-
ing, and terrorism financing, as well as studying many other social-economical
scenarios[7, 8, 9].
In this survey, we collect articles by searching in the Web of Science database
using specific terms including “cryptocurrency”, “transaction”, “Bitcoin”, “Ethereum”,
and several notable altcoins and payment protocols such as “Monero”, “Zcash”,
and “Lightning Network”. Search results appeared in many primary computer
science and engineering [10, 11, 12], physics [13], and economic venues [14]. We
focus our survey on the knowledge discovery, i.e., data mining of user behaviors,
in cryptocurrency transaction records and identify three lines of work, namely:
• traceability and linkability analysis, which addresses whether chains of
transfers can be traced in the transaction records and whether blockchain
addresses can be associated, i.e., linked, to the same identity;
• collective transaction pattern analysis, which addresses the emerging user
behavior by examining the cryptocurrency economy from a macroscopic
perspective; and
• individual user behavior analysis, which focuses on discovering transaction
patterns from a single user or a particular type of user and using the
patterns downstream machine learning tasks.
We will present the background information for each line of work, summarize
the methodologies, and discuss major findings in these works.
This survey contributes to the literature by providing a complete spectrum
of knowledge discovery from cryptocurrency transactions and also serves as a
handbook for researchers and practitioners interested in harnessing the concur-
rency transaction data in their own research. Nonetheless, we also recognize
existing reviews that address individual subtopics covered in our survey, as fol-
lows. Technical introductions to current cryptocurrencies [15] and blockchain
[16, 17] designs cover issues such as data models, consensus protocols of dis-
tributed ledgers, and system throughputs. [18, 19, 20] address the anonymity,
privacy, and security issues of Bitcoin and Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies. De-
anonymization techniques using transaction records, mixing services, and de-
signs of altcoins were surveyed and discusses. A survey of tools for smart con-
tract code analysis can be found in [21]. Apart from the cryptocurrency trans-
action records, blockchain networks also produce other forms of data worthy of
analysis. For example, traffic analysis of the blockchain peer-to-peer networks is
particularly useful in understanding the systems’ communication overhead and
revealing user identities [22].
This survey is organized as follows. Section 2 provides basic concepts of
the cryptocurrency economy and blockchain data models. Section 3 addresses
the traceability and linkability analysis in Bitcoin, altcoins, and mixing service
3
scenarios. Section 4 addresses the collective patterns in cryptocurrency user
behaviors, with an emphasis on emerging structural patterns in the transaction
networks. Section 5 addresses the transaction pattern analyses for a single user
or a particular type of user. Section 6 summarizes the extract, transform, and
load (ETL); analytic; and visualization tools for cryptocurrency transactions as
well as online intelligence platforms. Section 7 discusses several open problems
in the field. Section 8 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The cryptocurrency economy
Early cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and its derivatives, were merely used
as payment media. Modern users also treat cryptocurrencies as investment or
speculation targets in primary and secondary markets, or as tokens in gambling
and recreational games.
Cryptocurrency as payment medium
Mining rewards. Mining, or minting, is the process of coin generation in
proof-of-work (PoW)-like blockchain systems. The generation of cryptocurren-
cies requires solving a computationally heavy problem. The party who success-
fully solves a problem can get a certain amount of cryptocurrency as a payment
for their resources spent. The mining process can be either an individual or a
collective effort. Individual miners can contribute their computing resources to
a mining pool and get rewards any time a peer miner solves the problem.
Faucet. Like mining, cryptocurrencies can also be rewarded to users who
complete generic tasks, such as solving a captcha. In this case, the party to
disseminate cryptocurrencies is a human envoy. This rewarding process is also
called a faucet.
Purchasing. Laszlo Hanyecz made the first documented offline purchase
with Bitcoin—10 000 BTC for two pizzas—back in 2010 [23]. Nowadays, end-
users of Bitcoin can use cryptocurrencies to make various purchases via online
marketplaces or offline shops, e.g., multimedia content, electronics, and clothes.
However, the most common purchases made using cryptocurrencies are drugs
in darknet markets.
Wallets. Online wallets are similar to banks, providing storage services for
users’ cryptocurrencies. Clients deposit to the wallet by transferring their cryp-
tocurrencies to the wallet services’ blockchain addresses and can make payments
by sending from online wallet’s addresses directly. Instead of maintaining their
offline public/private key pairs, users use a pair of traditional username and
password to access their wallets.
Ransom. Attributing to the anonymous feature of cryptocurrencies, extor-
sions such as computer malware, human kidnapping, sextortion, and blackmail-
ing often ask cryptocurrencies for ransom. Similarly, phishing emails asking for
cryptocurrency transactions are also commonly seen.
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Money laundering. The fast-moving nature of cryptocurrencies provide an
ideal channel for money laundering. Users can conceal the origin of illegally
obtained money by buying cryptocurrencies and later selling them to make
the money “clean.” Similar activities, such as bribing, also take advantage
of the anonymity of cryptocurrencies. However, this process leaves traces in
the cryptocurrency transactions and risks being exposed through transaction
analysis.
Cryptocurrency as virtual assets
Primary market. Start-up projects and companies can issue their own cryp-
tocurrencies to represent the equities of their projects. They sell their cryp-
tocurrency for fiat money or other value-bearing media through crowdfunding
activities, such as Initial Coin Offering (ICO) and Initial Equity Offering (IEO).
Investors who buy these cryptocurrencies usually sell them in cryptocurrency
exchanges for a profit later. Start-up projects can also use airdropping, i.e.,
sending out tokens to investors for free, to gain awareness of their projects.
Secondary market. Bitcoin was first publicly traded in online cryptocurrency
exchanges in 2010. Now, people can buy and sell cryptocurrencies with/for
fiat money, cryptocurrencies, or other value-bearing media on these platforms.
Exchanges can either execute users’ selling and buying orders automatically or
allow users to list and match their orders in a forum-like platform, i.e., in an
over-the-counter (OTC) fashion. Exchanges also provide various cryptocurrency
related financial products, such as futures and options. Some exchanges even
conduct “pump and dump” schemes to manipulate with cryptocurrency prices.
Ponzi scheme and pyramid sellings. Fraudulent activities are widely seen in
the cryptocurrency economy. Ponzi schemes, or HYIP, are the most common
types of fraud [24]. A Ponzi scheme lures investors to its program by awarding
early investors with an unreasonably high yield. However, when a new invest-
ment slows down, or the scheme organizers see fit, they stop giving out yields
and take away all the investments. Ponzi scheme often involves pyramid selling,
i.e., by allowing investors to sell the cryptocurrencies to their peer investors for
profit.
Cryptocurrency as token
Gambling. Gambling games, such as dice games and roulette, use cryp-
tocurrencies as chips. Gambling games are often the most active applications
on blockchain networks.
Multiplayer games. The introduction of the smart contract further enables
better flexibility to game design. Games such as Cryptokitties allow users to
generate tokens with random features, list them for sale, and buy or rent tokens
from other users.
2.2. Data Models
Bitcoin and Ethereum are the two milestones, i.e., blockchain 1.0 and 2.0,
in cryptocurrency and blockchain design. Most cryptocurrencies adopted and
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Figure 1: UTXO-based transaction data model.
modified upon their transaction record data models [17]. Bitcoin and its deriva-
tives use the unspent transaction output (UTXO)-based data models, while
Ethereum and its derivatives use the account-based data models.
UTXO-based data model
In a typical unspent transaction output (UTXO) data model (see Figure
1), addresses are the basic identities that hold virtual values. An address can
be generated offline using Bitcoin’s customized hash function to a public key
generated by the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to a user-
specified random number as the private key. The transfers of values are settled
by recording a transaction in the blockchain. In a typical UTXO transaction,
e.g., transaction 1 in in Figure 1, all the values stored in the input addresses,
e.g., addresses 1 and 2, are transferred to output addresses 3, 4, and 5, with
specific value allocations. The output addresses can be further used as the input
addresses in the following transactions. Note that, theoretically, the maximum
numbers of input and output addresses in a transaction are not limited, but
since the size of a transaction record cannot be larger than the block size, the
practical total number of input and output addresses has a limit.
Altcoins stand for alternatives for Bitcoin. For example, Litecoin and Doge-
coin are typical early altcoins that replicate most of Bitcoin’s technical designs.
Later altcoins, such as Zerocash and Monero, also adopt the UTXO-data model
but use extra cryptography techniques to enhance their anonymity. Each alt-
coin has its own running blockchain network, which stores the transactions of
this particular altcoin exclusively.
Account-based data model
Blockchains can store not only transactions but also other formats of data,
including text, image, and even computer codes. The code stored and executed
in the blockchain database is also called a (smart) contract. Ethereum and its
derivatives, such as Neo and EOS, use account-based transaction data models
[25], where the accounts are still blockchain addresses but can be either an
externally owned account (EOA) or a contract account (CoA). While an EOA
can be created using a similar method as an address in the Bitcoin blockchain,
CoAs must be created by a transaction: an EOA or a CoA sends a transaction
to a “null” receiver with computer codes written in the auxiliary information.
An address will then be generated by the blockchain system and assigned to the
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Figure 2: Account-based transaction data model.
CoA. Both types of accounts can hold the blockchain’s original cryptocurrency,
and their current holdings are stored in the blockchain’s running memory.
There are three possible types of transactions in an account-based data
model. First, a transfer of the blockchain’s original cryptocurrency from an
EOA to an EOA or a CoA (transaction 1 in Fig. 2). Second, the creation
of a contract or an invocation of the computer codes stored in a contract by
transferring a zero-value original cryptocurrency to it with auxiliary information
indicating the target function and a set of parameters (transaction 2 in Fig. 2).
Third, a token transfer. Contract creators can install a virtual token in a smart
contract, allow transfers of the token or part of it between blockchain identities
through specific functions like transfer() or distribute() (transaction 3 in
Fig. 2). The contract then records the changes to account balances. Note that
in this case, only the amount of the original cryptocurrency or tokens held by
EOAs or CoAs will be changed, but no actual transaction is explicitly logged in
the blockchain.
Other transaction data sources
Except for the transactions recorded in individual blockchain networks, trans-
fers of cryptocurrency can also happen across different blockchains or even be-
yond blockchains.
The most popular blockchains, e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum, occupy hundreds
of gigabytes of space in computer storage and are ever-expanding on a daily
basis. New technologies such as lightning network, sharding, and cross-chain
transactions have been proposed to ease the management overhead and reduce
the resources required to maintain the blockchain database. A lightning network
enables users to create “payment channels” and conduct transactions in the
channels before reporting the clearings to the blockchain. Sharding enables the
blockchain network to store the entire transaction history but only requires each
blockchain nodes to store a proportion of the transaction history. Cross-chain
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protocols enable users to swap cryptocurrencies across different blockchains. In
these cases, the shattered or entangled transaction records add to the difficulty
of transaction network analysis.
Users trade cryptocurrencies with other users in exchanges. Most of the
transactions in centralized exchanges are not publicly available, except for rare
exceptions, such as leaked datasets from hacking of an exchange’s database [26].
However, some OTC exchanges, e.g., bitcoin alpha [27] and bitcoin-otc [28], on
the contrary, disclose the transactions to the public. These transactions can be
further related to blockchain transactions, providing an auxiliary information
source of cryptocurrency flows.
3. Traceability and Linkability Issues
3.1. Tracing cryptocurrency transactions
The transparency of cryptocurrency transactions enables forensic analyses of
various crimes, using statistical analysis and graphical visualization techniques
to the payment transactions of thefts, ransomware, sextortion, and illicit trad-
ings. Several studies have demonstrated that forensic analyses can reveal the
entire course of criminal transactions with surprisingly high accuracy.
The most massive theft in cryptocurrency history was the Mt. Gox ex-
change hacking in 2011 [29]. The hackers allegedly stole more than 850 000
Bitcoin and led directly to the bankruptcy of the once largest cryptocurrency
exchange in the world. As cryptocurrencies must be turned into fiat money for
the thieves to profit, they must first transfer the stolen cryptocurrency into ex-
changes. Tracing analysis showed that the stolen bitcoins changed hands several
times before landing in exchanges BTC-e, 0x, Bitcoinica, and CryptoXChange.
Several interim addresses in the transaction flow, along with those from several
other major thefts, passed through addresses belonged to Alexander Vinnik, the
founder and main beneficiary of cryptocurrency exchange BTC-e. Vinnik was
eventually arrested for alleged money laundering in 2017 [6].
The Silk Road market was shut down by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in October 2013. The FBI seized 114 336 Bitcoins, i.e., transferred them
into an FBI-created arrest custody address. 89% of the Bitcoins came from
a set of 15 addresses at the end of a market escrow chain. However, among
the distributions that peeled off the chain, more than 100 000 Bitcoins finally
arrived into an address not relevant to the FBI [5]. It was believed that not
all the darknet Bitcoins were seized, but some were detained by individual FBI
agents who were later convicted for stealing in the Silk Road case [30].
Cryptocurrencies are ideal ransom payment mediums owing to the anonymity
feature. Many recent computer hacks, such as Cryptolocker and WannaCry,
asked for Bitcoin for ransom. [31, 32] showed that payments to 35 families of
ransomware, including the infamous CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, DMA Locker,
and WannaCry, are all traceable, mostly to a handful of responsible parties.
The economic impact of the ransomware from 2013 to mid-2017 was estimated
to be USD 12 million minimum.
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Figure 3: Schematics of swapping and CoinJoin mixing.
Moreover, cryptocurrency transactions can also reveal the monetary flows of
human trafficking and sextortion. For example, [33] was able to uncover human
traffickers by associating sex ads to specific Bitcoin transactions and addresses
with 90% accuracy. [34] tracked and investigated monetary flows of a series of
sextortion campaigns and found that one single entity was likely controlling the
financial backbone worth a minimum of USD 1.3 million.
3.2. Counter-tracing measures
In the light that the original design of Bitcoin’s transactions is easy to trace,
clever thieves and extortioners may use counter-tracing solutions to cover the
trace of their activities. Typical solutions include mixing services provided by
third parties and altcoins with intrinsic privacy-enhancing designs.
Mixing services
Mixing services aim to solve cryptocurrencies’ traceability issues by merging
irrelevant transactions. The two typical types of mixing methods are swapping
and CoinJoin. A swapping-based mixing service (Fig. 3a) accepts deposits
from users to one of the addresses in an address pool and withdraw from an-
other. Hence, the linkage between the deposit and withdraw addresses are
disconnected. Mixing services using swapping include BitcoinFog, BitLaundry,
and Helix. The CoinJoin (Fig. 3b) mechanism allows two or more individual
transactions (left) to be combined in a single CoinJoin transaction, which has
the same presence as an ordinary multiple-input-multiple-output transaction
(right) on the blockchain. Therefore, the relationship between real input-output
pairs is obscured. CoinJoin-based services include JoinMarket, CoinShuffle, and
Blockchain.info’s SharedCoin (ceased service).
Mixing services are designed to hide the relationship between addresses in
consecutive transactions. Therefore, they are often used for money laundering
purposes for illicit activities. Under today’s virtual asset market regulations,
cryptocurrency exchanges can reject deposits from mixing service outflows under
anti-money laundering (AML) regulation [35].
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Altcoins with privacy-enhancing design
This section covers the two major privacy-enhancing designs in altcoins,
i.e., altcoins with decentralized mixing capabilities, such as Zerocoin, Zerocash,
Zcash, and Dash; and CryptoNote design, including Monero, Bytecoin, and
DigitalNote. We will use Zcash and Monero to illustrate the two lines of designs.
Zcash allows users to store and transact ZEC, i.e., the Zcash cryptocurrency,
with two types of addresses (transparent and shielded) [36]. “Transparent” ad-
dresses transfer values to other addresses essentially the same way as Bitcoin,
while “shielded” addresses make transactions in “shielded pools”. In partic-
ular, when depositing into the pool, the recipient is specified using shielded
addresses, i.e., z -address, which hides the recipient but still reveals the sender,
and withdrawing from the pool hides the sender but reveals the recipient. The
cryptographical basis for the shielded pool is practical zero-knowledge proofs
called zk -SNARKs. From the perspective of data models, Zcash transactions
resemble a swapping mixing pool pattern.
Though zero-knowledge proofs form virtual mixing pools, they suffer from
the disadvantage of computational cost. CryptoNote-like cryptocurrencies, such
as Monero, take another perspective, i.e., ring signature, to add complexity to
the transaction records without causing much computational overhead [37]. A
Monero transaction allows several outputs from previous transactions to be
merged as its inputs, but only that some of the inputs can be “decoy” as their
values are never transferred to the output.
3.3. Taint analysis techniques
Mixing services and altcoin designs add extra layers of complexity to the
transaction record by hiding the association between blockchain addresses. Nev-
ertheless, they can still leave sufficient information for “taint analysis”, i.e.,
tracing monetary flow and linking related blockchain addresses. We categorize
existing taint analysis techniques into several types of heuristics and the graph
matching approach.
Heuristics
Commonly used heuristics in address associating and linking include the
multiple inputs rule, the coin change rule, the zero-mix rule for cryptocurrencies
with ring-signature design, and temporal heuristics. We formulate the first three
types using graph representations, as shown in Figure 4.
Multiple inputs is the most basic and widely adopted rule in associating
UTXO addresses that potentially belong to the same user. When initiating a
transaction, users have to sign the transaction with all of the input addresses’
private keys. Therefore, all the input addresses in a transaction can be assumed
to be owned by the same party [4, 10, 38]. For example, addresses 1 and 2 in
Figure 4a can be considered belonging to the same user.
Coin change. The input value and output value in a UTXO transaction
must be equal. If the input value is larger than the designated transaction
value, the residue must be returned to a (usually new) address held by the
10
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Figure 4: Commonly used heuristics in taint analysis: (a) multiple inputs, (b) coin change,
and (c) zero-mix.
transaction initiator, i.e., a change address. For example, addresses 3 in Figure
4b is potentially a change in this transaction, and hence, belong to the same
user who owned address 1.
The roll-out of the “coin selection” strategy in the official Bitcoin offline
wallet, Bitcoin Core, in 2012 made the coin change rule even more obvious.
When the user enters the amount of Bitcoin to be transferred to destination
addresses, the client software automatically chooses the set of input addresses
with an exact match to the value or a minimum change output. The change
addresses usually hold only a small value and typically appear in transactions
only once or twice. The coin change rule is usually used in conjunction with the
multiple inputs rule [10, 38, 39].
Except for the most commonly used multiple inputs and coin change rules,
other heuristics for Bitcoin transactions may also consider that all the output in
a coinbase transaction belong to the same entity [40] or exploit specific transac-
tion patterns, e.g., apparent self-transferring operations and those that resemble
money laundering activities in a conventional banking system, to associate ad-
dresses [41].
Zero-mix, aka cascade attack or cascade effect, is a specific heuristic for
CryptoNote cryptocurrencies. Let’s assume the scenario as shown in Figure 4c,
where transaction 1 takes two unspent-inputs from addresses 1 and 2 at time t
and transaction 2 takes the unspent-input from address 2 at time t+ δt. In this
case, transaction 2 takes no foreign outputs used as mix-ins for the associated
ring-signature and therefore is a zero-mix transaction. Hence, address 2 must
be a real input in transaction 2 and a decoy in transaction 1 [37].
Zero-mix in is a special case in the more general “closed set” attack pro-
posed in [42]. If the number of inputs equals the number of distinct public-keys
included in a CryptoNote transaction, i.e., forming a closed-set, they are all real-
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Figure 5: Illustration of the graph matching problem in tracing merged transactions.
spends in this transaction hence decoys in other transactions. [42] also proposed
a computationally efficient realization of this attack.
Temporal heuristics exploits the timing of deposit and withdraw transactions
in mixing services and altcoins transactions. For example, [43] found that tem-
porally close deposit and withdraw transactions in Zcash’s shielded pools have
a high possibility of linkability. [37] also discovered that the ages of transaction
outputs could be used to differentiate genuine and decoy inputs in CryptoNote
transactions.
Graph matching
Centralized and decentralized mixing services and altcoin designs follow a
similar basis: merge irrelevant transfers into one blockchain transaction record
to decrease these transactions’ traceability. However, the fingerprints of trans-
ferred cryptocurrency values could still reveal the actual input-output pairs.
Considering that users would deposit and withdraw the same amount of
cryptocurrency to and from the mixing service, a widely adopted method to
find input-output pairs is to find matched values or value combinations in the
multiple-input-multiple-output transactions[37, 44, 45]. Given a set of inputs
I = {I1, I2, ...} and a set of outputs O = {O1, O2, ...}, the graph matching tries
to find the exact match or the most probable matches between subsets of I ′ ⊆ I
and O′ ⊆ O. As shown in Figure 5, the input values of address 1 and address
2 matches the output to address 5, and therefore, addresses 1, 2, and 5 might
belong to the same user. Other matches in this transaction are also linked by
the red lines.
Note that graph matching is an NP-hard problem. Simplification of the prob-
lem can impose a time constraint, e.g., only consider temporally close input and
outputs, to narrowing down the search for possible matches [46]. Special cases of
the graph matching method are some times referred to as value fingerprinting
heuristic [36] or “round-trip” transactions [43], where exact values match for
single input and output in centralized or decentralized mixing pools. Similarly,
matches of multiple digits between inputs and outputs [47] are also considered
evidence of possible links between addresses.
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3.4. Findings
Overall, Bitcoin and its replicates showed strong traceability: 87.6% of trans-
actions in Bitcoin, 88.5% in Bitcoin Cash, and 85% in Litecoin have a single
output [48]. As for linkability, using the multiple inputs rule, the number of
clusters of associated Bitcoin addresses is approximately 45%–70% of the total
number of addresses [19]. When the coin change rule is applied with the multiple
input rule, the number of associated Bitcoin address clusters further decreases
to 22%–37% of the total number of addresses [19]. Associating addresses can re-
veal addresses identities if one of the associated address is revealed. The largest
cluster of associated Bitcoin addresses up to 2012 (156 722 addresses) were iden-
tified as the cryptocurrency exchange Mt. Gox, followed by well-known wallets
and mining pools [49]. [50] successfully associated 968 unknown addresses to
two addresses belonging to CryptoLocker found in Reddit.
However, heuristic rules are also prone to error. For example, the multiple
inputs rule’s effectiveness depends on repeated address use by a single user and
can lose its efficacy if no UTXO address is reused or with CoinJoin-like mixing
and ring signature altcoins [51]. Nick [38] tested the multiple inputs and coin
change rules on a dataset containing 30 000 sets of Bitcoin addresses from the
leaked BitcoinJ wallets, where each set of addresses belongs to an end-user. Us-
ing the multiple inputs rule alone, the associated clusters of addresses achieved
a 68.6% average recall ratio. With the coin change rule imposed, the average
recall ratio only rose to 69.3%, which accounts for less than 1% of an increase
in the accuracy. [52] showed that addresses clustered by mere heuristic rules
could belong to several different entities, and therefore, proposed a probabilistic
algorithm that utilizes known address tags to improve the heuristic rules.
Due to the lack of mixing services’ ground truth data, reported precisions of
mixing services’ taint analysis are rare. Nonetheless, [46] used graph matching
and temporal heuristics and found that 99.1% of the input and output transac-
tions performed by the mixing service provider Helix can be associated.
Although providing decentralized mixing functions, most Zcash activities
are in the transparent part of the blockchain. Mining pools play essential roles
in Zcash ecology. Mining rewards can be linked to 87.5% addresses and 25.7%
transactions [53], and that 95.5% of the total number of Zcash transactions are
potentially linkable to public addresses by just observing the mining activity
[54]. What is more, 31.5% of all coins sent to shielded addresses can be matched
to public addresses using taint analysis techniques [43]. The primary users of
the shielded pools are still mining pools: 65.6% of the value withdrawn from the
shielded pool can be linked back to deposits made by either founders or miners
[55].
The multiple inputs rule loses its efficacy against CryptoNote designs, as
the decoy addresses are usually not owned by the holders of the real inputs.
However, careless usage of transaction outputs together in a new transaction
can still reveal the ownership of the original transaction outputs [37]. Using
zero-mix rule only, [56] was able to identify 62% of the real inputs in Monero
transactions with one or more mixes. The accuracy increased to 80% when
13
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Figure 6: Network construction from UTXO-based transactions.
temporal heuristics are considered. [57] found that in 87% of cases, the real
Monero output from a redeemed can be easily identified with certainty with
temporal heuristics. [42] were able to identify the real coin being spent in
70.52% Monero inputs, 74.25% Bytecoin inputs, and in 91.56% DigitalNote
inputs, using the zero-mix rule and their “closed set” attack.
4. Collective Transaction Patterns
Networks are ubiquitous in physical, technical, social, and economic systems
with interconnected components. The study of complex networks in the past
20 years has shown that real-world networks possess universal underlying struc-
tural properties, such as scale-free property and small-world phenomena, and
similar network formation mechanisms, e.g., preferential attachment [58]. Net-
work analysis is widely adopted in the study of cryptocurrency transactions and
has proven particularly useful in characterizing cryptocurrency user activities
by examining these networks’ temporal and structural properties.
4.1. Transaction Network Construction
A network G = (V,E) consists of two sets of entities, i.e., a collection of
nodes, V , and a collection of edges, E, connecting the nodes together. The con-
struction of transaction networks for UTXO, account-based, and other transac-
tion data models have subtle differences. This section summarizes three types of
networks constructed from UTXO transactions, three types from account-based
transactions, and discusses transaction network construction from the Lightning
payment channels.
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UTXO transaction networks (Fig. 6)
Type I network, or address network, uses addresses as nodes in the network
and the flow of virtual values as edges [59, 60]. For example, input addresses 1
and 2 are connected to addresses 3, 4, and 5 with directed edges representing
the value flow in transaction 1. The edges are usually unweighted because the
actual transferred value between a specific pair of addresses is not explicitly
given. Therefore, multiple-input-multiple-output transactions may create large
cliques in the network.
Type II network, or transaction network, uses transactions as nodes in the
network, in which transactions are connected by the sharing of output/input
addresses [45, 61]. For example, transaction 1 is connected to transaction 2
with directed edges, as the output addresses 3 and 4 of transaction 1 are used
as the input addresses in transaction 2. The edges in this type of network can
be weighted, i.e., the value being held in the interim addresses at that time. In
some cases, Type I and Type II networks are combined, i.e., all the addresses and
transactions are nodes in the network, while the input and output relationship
between the addresses and transactions are considered edges [62, 63, 64].
Type III network, or user network, considers the flow of cryptocurrencies
between users [49, 65]. However, since the blockchain addresses are anonymous,
i.e., the addresses cannot be tied to user identities directly, association rules
must be applied to associate addresses with potentially the same identity. Also,
note that the Type II network is actually an interim state between the Type I
and Type III networks in that it only considers all the inputs of a transaction
being an entity but does not further merge all the entities with shared input
addresses.
Account-based transaction networks
Type I network, or the original cryptocurrency transfer network, uses EOAs
and CoAs as nodes in the network and the flow of non-zero original cryptocur-
rency as edges [66]. The edges are directed and weighted by the amount sent in
the transactions.
Type II network, or token transfer network, also uses EOAs and CoAs as
nodes in the network but uses the flow of user-customized tokens as edges [67,
68].
Type III network, or invocation network, considers the creations and non-
transactional function calls to smart contracts [12]. This network uses EOAs
and CoAs as nodes, with directed edges pointing from the invoker addresses to
the contract addresses, representing the creation or invoking relationship.
Lightning network
Lightning Network (LN), launched in 2018, is the mainstream payment chan-
nel network (PCN). It attempts to relieve the pressure of ever-expanding Bitcoin
ledger by creating payment channels across which any two users could exchange
off-chain payments without burdening the entire network. The LN protocol
specifies how to open payment channels and to route off-chain payments across
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Figure 7: Number of transactions per day in the Bitcoin blockchain network from 2009 to
2020.
a network of payment channels. A payment channel network is a network of
payment channels where off-chain payments are routed [69], rather than trans-
actions between blockchain addresses. Information about live payment channels
can be found on monitoring websites such as hashxp.org, 1ml.com, and lndex-
plorer.com [70].
4.2. Emerging structural properties
Growth of the networks
As of 2020, the total number of unique Bitcoin addresses appearing in the
transactions was more than 600 million [71], and that of Ethereum over 100
million [3], with a daily increase of hundreds of thousands [2]. Therefore, new
nodes and edges were introduced continuously into the transaction network,
resulting in ever-expanding network size. As the first cryptocurrency, the growth
of Bitcoin networks went through two stages: the initial stage (until the end of
2010) and the trading stage (since 2011) [72, 73, 74] (see Fig. 7). The networks
of other cryptocurrencies showed similar trends.
The growth rate of the networks depends on the adoption of cryptocurren-
cies. In the initial stage, Bitcoin was still an experimental idea used only by a
small group of early adopters. The transaction volume was low, and the net-
work structure fluctuated severely. The growth in the numbers of nodes and
edges, network diameter, and the average distance between nodes correlated
positively with the Bitcoin price [75, 76]. The rise of the Bitcoin price, in turn,
attracted more attention to Bitcoin, which further expanded the user commu-
nity and hence the network scale [77, 78]. The average balance of Bitcoin in
the blockchain addresses decreased as the user community expanded [77]. In
the trading stage, Bitcoin began to be accepted by a broader range of users
and began to flow between addresses, resulting in a quickly expanding network
size, and the structural properties, such as degree distribution and clustering
coefficient, began to stabilize.
16
Centralized networks
The degree distribution is the most common characterization of networks.
Many real-world networks, such as the World Wide Web, movie actor collab-
oration network, and power grid networks, exhibit long tail, and sometimes
power-law, distributed node degrees [79]. In these networks, most nodes have
a limited number of neighbors, but some nodes can have a massive amount
of connections. The degree distribution of the Bitcoin network (Types I and
III) converged to a power-law distribution gradually over time, resulting in a
scale-free network around 2010 [66, 75, 80]. The Type I [66, 80] and Type III
[81] Ethereum networks also exhibit power-law degree distributions with the
power-law exponent γ ≈ 2.
Preferential attachment, one plausible mechanism driving real-world net-
works’ evolution, refers to new nodes joining the network tend to connect to
existing nodes with higher degrees. The preferential attachment was observed
in Type I Bitcoin network’s growth: hub nodes grow faster than low-degree
nodes [72]. However, preferential attachment to the higher degree or richer
nodes may not be an accurate mechanism to the Type III Bitcoin network’s
growth. [74] proposed a fitness preferential attachment mechanism, where the
fitness of a node v is its potential to create new connections, i.e.,
fv(t) =
kv(t)− kv(t− 1)∑m
u=1 (ku(t)− ku(t− 1))
,
where t is the number of months starting from January 2019, k is the degree
of a node, and m is the number of nodes in this month’s network. Different
types of users have different intrinsic fitness: cryptocurrency exchanges are more
attractive to connections than active traders, who are then more attractive than
a common adopter of Bitcoin.
Another possible outcome of preferential attachment is that nodes with small
degrees connect disproportionally to those with large degrees. This connection
pattern is also referred to as disassortative mixing, e.g., nodes tending to connect
to those with different structural properties. Most early-stage cryptocurrency
transaction networks, such as the Type I Bitcoin network from 2009 to 2013 [72],
the Type I Litecoin network from 2009 to 2010 [80], and the Type I Ethereum
network from 2015 to 2017 [82] all showed disassortative mixing. In the cryp-
tocurrency economy, disassortative mixing reveals that most transactions hap-
pen between end-users and popular services such as cryptocurrency exchanges,
wallets, gaming, and gambling services, yet less frequently among the end-users
themselves. However, the assortativity of the transaction networks increased
over time. For example, the Type I Bitcoin and Type I Namecoin networks’
assortativity eventually converged to 0 [73]. This increment could have two
causes: 1) high-degree nodes began to transfer cryptocurrencies among them-
selves, e.g., cryptocurrencies moving between multiple holding addresses with
the same exchange, or 2) low-degree nodes could have started to have more
interactions among themselves.
Not surprisingly, the Lightning Network also evolved into a centralized net-
work. The early LN was disconnected, consisting of mostly small clusters and
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occasionally larger cliques [83]. On June 13, 2018, the LN’s snapshot contained
1355 nodes in the weakly connected component and 889 nodes in the discon-
nected periphery, exhibiting a degree distribution with γ ≈ 2 [84]. The LN
gradually grew into a centralized network, with a distinct core-periphery struc-
ture. The Bitcoins distribution in each channel has an unequal Gini coefficient
of the node strengths 0.88 in 2019 [85]. The centralized structure of the payment
network exposes it under targeted attacks, i.e., a DDoS attack targeting hub
nodes can remarkably sabotage the LN’s efficiency [86, 87].
Since most commonly seen complex networks evolve power law in their de-
gree distributions, a transaction network that deviates significantly from these
rules is usually induced by anomalous activities [88]. Although the in-degree and
out-degree distributions of the Bitcoin network generally followed the power-law
distribution, some severe fluctuations exist in the distributions [65, 89]. [65] be-
lieved that these anomalies are caused by a deliberate transaction pattern called
“pseudo-spam chain,” i.e., a large number of tiny value transactions. Similar
disruptions can also be found in the transaction time interval distribution in the
Ethereum blockchain: instead of following a strict power law, the distribution
has some spikes at certain time intervals [90]. This anomaly was conjectured to
be due to deliberate individual activities such as trading bots.
A small world
Many complex networks show two characteristics when growing: densifica-
tion, i.e., the increase in the number of edges in the network is super-linear to
that of the nodes; and shrinking diameters, i.e., the average path length of the
network shortens [91]. These characteristics are the indicators of small-world
networks, along with a large clustering coefficient [92].
Super-linearity between the increment of the number of edges, M , and the
number of nodes, N , can be characterized by
M(t) ∼ N(t)α,
where M(t) and N(t) are the number of edges and nodes in the network at
time t, respectively. If α > 1, super-linearity presents in the network evolution,
and the average degree of all nodes will also increase over time. Super-linearity
appeared in the early stages of transaction network growth. For the Type I
Bitcoin network, the average out-degree of nodes increased from less than two
in 2009 to around six in 2012 [59]. The nodes’ out-degrees in the Type III
Bitcoin network increased from around 2.6 in 2013 to around 3.1 in 2015 [65].
The Type I Ethereum network showed a general linear growth between the
number of edges to the number of nodes, i.e., α=1.0, from 2015 to 2017, but
super-linearity emerged, i.e., α=1.38 in the last 1/3 of the transaction record
[73].
However, the super-linear growth of the transaction networks did not persist
[73]. Although α=1.15 for the Type I Bitcoin network constructed from trans-
actions spanning from 2009 to 2017, it decreased to 0.86, i.e., demonstrating a
sub-linearity, between 2014 and 2017. The situation was similar in the Type
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Figure 8: A schematic illustration of the bow-tie structure in a directed network.
I Namecoin network, in which α decreased from 1.05 to 0.99. A decreasing α
means that users tend not to reuse previously used blockchain addresses and
create new addresses in transactions to preserve their anonymity better. There-
fore, the network evolution enters a new stage in which nodes’ growth rate
surpasses that of edges, and the network becomes sparse. However, the final
stage may not happen to account-based blockchains such as Ethereum because
the account creation procedure on these blockchains is much more complicated
than UTXO blockchains. A less user-friendly address creation procedure may
discourage users from creating new accounts on the blockchain.
“Six degrees of separation” is a common metaphor for small-world networks,
emphasizing a short average path length between each pair of nodes in the net-
work. The average shortest path length in the Type III Bitcoin network’s largest
connected component decreased from around five to around four from 2013 to
2015 [65]. On the contrary, the average shortest path length in Ethereum in-
creased. The average distance between nodes in weekly snapshots of the combi-
nation of Type I and Type III Ethereum networks increased from around four
in 2015 to five in 2018 [93]. The shrinking of the average distance in a Bitcoin
network may be attributable to the introduction of popular services such as ex-
changes and wallets during that period. The expanse of network distance in the
Ethereum network may be because a great number of new users were adopting
the blockchain network and creating a huge number of new nodes, which were
not yet densely connected.
A typical small-world network has a significantly larger clustering coefficient
than a randomized network with the same size and density [92]. The average
clustering coefficient of the Type III Bitcoin network was around 0.15 during
2011 and 2013 [66]. For the Type I Bitcoin network, the clustering coefficient
was as high as 0.8 during 2009, but it decreased to 0.04 in 2014 [80] and stayed
stationary around 0.05 afterward [73]. The clustering coefficient of the combina-
tion of Type I and III Ethereum networks was close to 0 initially but increased
to and remained at around 0.01 after block height 3 000 [93]. The clustering
coefficients in different transaction networks were all higher than those in the
randomized networks.
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A bow-tie structure
Large directed networks can evolve into a visually “bow-tie”-like structure
(Fig. 8). The bow-tie structure consists of four components: 1) a strongly con-
nected component (SCC), which is the core of the network; 2) an in-component
(IN); 3) an out-component (OUT), which are the sets of nodes reachable to and
from the SCC, respectively; and 4) the tendrils, which are the sets of nodes
unreachable to and from the SCC. [82] found that monthly snapshots of the
Type I Ethereum network possess such a bow-tie structure. The SCC probably
contains the hub nodes, e.g., exchange and wallets, and the IN and the OUT
components are most likely the end-users. The tube component composed of
tendrils can be regarded as extra bridges from the IN component to the OUT
component.
Community structure
A network contains community structure if it can be easily grouped into
densely-connected sub-networks. Community detection algorithms are used as
an enhancement to the heuristics rules of blockchain address association. For
example, [94] conducted a two-step clustering process to Bitcoin addresses, i.e.,
first use the multiple inputs and coin change rules to associate addresses, then
use Louvain algorithm to partition the transaction addresses into several com-
munities further. They were able to find a set of CryptoLocker blackmail ad-
dresses using this process. [95] used multiple inputs and coin change heuristics
to construct Type II Bitcoin network and used a community detection algo-
rithm to partition the network into different activities further and improved the
results obtained in [10].
4.3. Other collective patterns
Preferential attachment not only results in a skewed degree distribution but
also a centralized accumulation of wealth of blockchain addresses, e.g., wealthier
addresses accumulate cryptocurrencies significantly faster than the less wealthy
ones [72]. The Bitcoin [49] and Ether [66, 80] wealth possession distribution in
blockchain addresses both exhibit power-law. The highly wealthy addresses are
not necessarily individual end-users but can also be exchanges or wallet services.
Moreover, power-law distributions were also observed in the transaction value
[75] and the time intervals between consecutive Bitcoin transactions initiated
by the same addresses [72].
The increasing centralization has also shown in the creation and usage of
smart contracts. Until 2018, smart contracts in Ethereum are only used to de-
velop very simple token-centric applications, e.g., ICOs and crowdsales. Eighty
percents of the smart contracts use at most 211 instructions [96]. Smart con-
tract code similarity reveals substantial code reuse, where less than 10% of
user-created contracts are unique, and less than 1% of contract-created con-
tracts are so [97]. Moreover, contracts are three times more likely to be created
by other contracts than they are by users [97].
As a result, 0.05% of the smart contracts are the target of 80% of the trans-
actions [96], and that over 60% of contracts have never been interacted with
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[97]. [98] surveyed 10 000 smart contracts source codes and a dataset of meta-
data from etherscan.io. They found that the number of transactions and the
balances of these contracts follow power-law and that the 20 smart contracts
with the topmost number of transactions are all financial contracts.
Transaction fees are the small amount of money that a user pays to the
miners, i.e., the blockchain ledger keepers, when initiating a transaction. De-
pending on the busyness of the blockchain networks, fees may vary. The Bitcoin
transaction fee per transaction surged at the end of 2017, to over USD 50, due to
intensive network activities at that time and stabilized at several US dollars in
2020 [2]. It is notable that a non-negligible amount of Bitcoin addresses possess
only a “dust” amount of values, i.e., they cost more in transaction fees to spend
than the output value [48]. Transaction fees in the Ethereum blockchain are
called gas, which is the cost necessary to perform a transaction by miners. A
transaction involving complex smart contract execution can have higher prices
than an ordinary Ether transaction [99]. Miners can set the minimum gas price
and decline to process a transaction if it does not meet their price threshold.
[100] found that the number of pending transactions and the number of miners
in the network have a significant influence on Ethereum gas fees.
5. Individual Behavior Analysis
An extensive literature focuses on characterizing and differentiating the ac-
tivities of a specific type of agent in the cryptocurrency economy. The identities
of blockchain addresses can be obtained from public online venues or interacting
with known cryptocurrency services. Then, transaction features are extracted
for the exploratory study of user behaviors as well as downstream machine learn-
ing tasks to classify the identities of blockchain addresses or look for anomalies
in the transaction records.
5.1. Tagging addresses
Despite the anonymity nature of cryptocurrencies, service providers, such
as exchange, wallets, and gaming, choose to disclose their blockchain addresses
publicly. Some end-users also post their addresses in online marketplaces or
forums to collect payments. Addresses related to major theft cases [4] and
Ponzi schemes [101] can also be found on Reddit and BitcoinTalk. Researchers
can also proactively collect addresses identities using cryptocurrency services
and tracing the transactions from their own addresses [10]. Furthermore, the
Ethereum Naming Service assigns humanly readable names to complex hash
addresses, and therefore, can be used to reveal blockchain addresses’ identities
[102].
The most commonly revealed addresses include cryptocurrency exchanges,
merchants, escrow services, mining pools, gaming, gambling, and online wallets.
Other less commonly found labels include mixing services, various scams includ-
ing Ponzi schemes, ransoms, stolen bitcoins, and attackers. Start-up projects
also disclose their holding addresses when disseminating tokens in the primary
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market. Note that, using the addresses association techniques mentioned in
Section 3, when one address in a node is tagged with a label, the label can be
automatically inherited by all the other associated addresses.
Today’s online intelligence platforms such as Blockchain.info [2], Ether-
scan.io [3], and WalletExplorer [103] maintain lists of known blockchain ad-
dresses for user reference. Blockchain data analysis service providers, such as
Elliptic [104] and Chainalysis [105], also provide address labels to collaborators
for research and law enforcement purposes [106].
5.2. Transaction features
We categorize the commonly considered transaction patterns for individ-
ual addresses into four categories: volume, temporal, network structural, and
contract code features.
Volume features of an address include attributes such as the numbers of
incoming/outgoing transactions, total volume of these transactions, balance,
transaction fee paid, mining rewards revived, and aggregated figures such as
the average, mean, and standard deviation of the previous features.
Temporal features of an address include the activity period duration, activity
intensity, and the average, mean, and variance of activity time intervals, as well
as the skewness and kurtosis of the time interval distribution.
Transaction network structural features include node centrality, motif, net-
work embedding, and neighbor identity information. Centrality is a measure of
the importance of the nodes and edges in the network. Generic node central-
ity measurements include degree centrality, Eigenvector centrality, PageRank
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality [107]. Transaction
network-specific centralities include the generalized entropic centrality proposed
in [108] and mint centrality proposed in [61]. The generalized entropic centrality
of a node u in Type III UTXO networks measures how likely a monetary flow
goes from u to any other node w. First, the probability of flow starting at u
and end with w is defined by
puw =
∑
P∈Ps,w
∏
v∈Ps
τPv(v)
f(v′, v)
|S(Pv)|
,
where s is an auxiliary vertex that serves as the source of the flow and has a
single edge pointing to i; the sum is over all paths P from s to w; τPv(v) is the
probability that the flow goes out of v on a particular subset of N (Pv), given
the path Pv was used to arrive at v; and f(v
′, v) is the amount of monetary
flow from v′ to v. The mint centrality in Type II UTXO network of an address
A at a given block height h is the number of distinct block heights of coinbase
transactions with which address A can be associated, through the transaction
outputs it owned at any height prior to and including h. For example, in a
Type II UTXO network as shown in Fig. 9, the squared boxes indicate different
blocks; C1 and C2 are coinbase transactions; T1, T2, and T3 are non-coinbase
transactions. The mint centrality mc(A, h) can be computed as follows:
mc(A, h)=
1
h
∑h
j=1
rhj ,
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Figure 9: Schematic of mint centrality.
where rhj is either 1 or 0, representing whether or not the coinbase at height
j is linked to address A. Highly ranked Bitcoin addresses in mint centrality
belong to SatoshiDICE as well as its associated addresses, faucet, and donation
addresses.
Motifs are small building blocks that center around, start from, or end with
a target node. In some networks, particular motifs appear more frequently than
in the randomized network. These signature motifs in the network can often
reveal the functional features of the real systems [109]. The smallest motif is
a loop of two nodes connected by a pair of directed edges. A larger motif can
consist of a particular connection pattern of three or four nodes. The clustering
coefficient can also be categorized in this feature class because it calculates the
number of triangles around a central node.
Network embedding encodes the structural features of a node into a low-
dimensional space. Embeddings are usually constructed by network representa-
tion learning, i.e., an end-to-end training method that automatically transforms
a network structure into a low-dimensional space. Early network representation
methods include deepwalk [110], node2vec [111], or other customized biased
random walks [112]. These methods capture the similarity between nodes as
the overlap of neighbor nodes found by a random walk. By contrast, graph
neural networks (GNN) take a network as the input and predefined node labels
as the output and learn the nodes’ feature vectors in an end-to-end learning
scheme [113]. Since the transaction networks are temporal, i.e., the structure
changes with time, temporal GNN models such as EvolveGCN are also used in
transaction analysis [114].
Neighbor identity features are usually dummy coded features indicating the
existence of a labeled sample in a node’s neighbors.
Contract code features. Source code and compiled code features are com-
monly used for the analysis of smart contracts. Code stylometry refers to the
quantification and measurement of unique styles, e.g., wording frequency and
the use of specific variable and function names [115, 116]. Furthermore, the
symbolic analysis of programs’ control flow can also yield multiple useful infor-
mation for the identification of bugs or malicious contracts [117].
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Figure 10: Distribution modes of mining pools in PoW UTXO cryptocurrencies.
5.3. Signature behaviors of cryptocurrency economy agents
Miners
Blockchain networks reward the ledger keepers for their resources consumed.
For example, a coinbase transaction is written as the first record in each block
of the Bitcoin blockchain, containing a particular value of Bitcoin transferred
from a “no input” address to one or more miner specified addresses. Bitcoin
mining rewards were given to single miners in the early days when Bitcoin was
only adopted by a small group of early players. However, when Bitcoin’s price
surged, the mining game changed. The difficulty of the mathematical problem
that ledger keepers need to solve skyrocketed and single miners possessed little
chance to solve a problem alone. Therefore, small miners formed or joined
mining pools to pool their computational power and share the mining reward
based on the resources invested [118]. [119] found that the percentage of pool-
mined blocks was already 91.12% in Bitcoin and 92.2% in Ethereum, in July
2018. A handful of mining pools, such as F2Pool and AntPool, control most
computational resources in the Bitcoin blockchain network [120]. Mining pool
addresses are with the highest degree-based and betweenness centralities in the
transaction networks [121].
The transaction network structure helps to reveal the reward distributions
among pool members in different mining pools. The simplest reward distribution
method for a mining pool is to record a coinbase transaction with multiple
output addresses, which directly belong to the miners (Fig. 10a). However,
this distribution method has several downsides. First, when the mining pool
grows big, e.g., to hundreds or more members, the mining reward cannot be
distributed in a single transaction as the block size limits the maximum number
of input and output addresses a transaction contains. Second, it requires a
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consensus of fixed distribution among members a priori to the actual mining
task. Lazy miners could retain partial computational power in the actual task
to receive a higher reward than deserved. Therefore, A natural improvement is
that mining pools can use an interim reward holding address to aggregate all
the output from coinbase transactions before distributing them among the pool
members (Fig. 10b), e.g., F2Poll in 2014 [122]. Rewards to pool members can
also be distributed in batches. For example, the mining pool ViaBTC divides
the reward into multiple holding addresses and uses them to initiate multiple
output transactions to the pool members (Fig. 10c). Another possibility is
to initiate a multiple output transaction to the miners using the mining pool’s
holding address, but include another holding address in the outputs. Hence, the
mining pool can further distribute mining rewards and eventually form a chain-
like distribution pattern (Fig. 10d). Note that the output holding address
in each chain transaction can be the input address (as used in BTC.com) or
another new address (as used in AntPool) [123].
The competition between mining pools became severe over the years. PoW-
based coin mining is a process of looking for a random number whose hashed
value falls into a specific range. Some mining pools simultaneously mined sev-
eral blockchain ledgers with the same design, e.g., Bitcoin, Litecoin, Namecoin,
Dogecoin, Huntercoin, and Myriadcoin [124]. However, such “merged mining”
has operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered
by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. Some other min-
ing pools tried to exploit the cryptocurrency system design for a larger profit.
For example, Ethereum blockchain not only rewards the winner of the mining
mechanism but also rewards those who produced new but unused ledger updates
(uncle blocks). [125] found that during May and July 2018, a swarm of 7 500
miners with conspicuously small hash rates orchestrated by a single adversary
managed to receive 19% of the total uncle block without competing directly for
the primary mining rewards.
Miners might also hop from pool to pool to boost their reward [126]. An
analysis of Kano and Slush mining pool members found that hopping miners’
medium rewards were three times higher for those stuck to one pool [127].
However, no matter which mining pool they belonged, the miners all transferred
the reward quickly into the same set of blockchain addresses, which belonged
to exchanges, wallets, or gambling services [128]. The average interval between
miners receiving the reward to the time of such transfers shortened from 138
days in 2009 to 1.5 days in 2013 [122].
Darknet market escrow
Darknet markets are online trading platforms hosted on covert computer
servers, which are only accessible through encrypted networks. Illicit merchan-
dise, such as drugs, weapons, and private data, are the most common commodi-
ties on darknet markets. Cryptocurrencies became the major payment medium
of darknet markets, attributed to their anonymity nature. Payments between
vendors and buyers have two modes. One is that the buyers transfer cryptocur-
rencies directly into the vendors’ addresses. However, vendors and buyers have
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Figure 11: Market escrow distribution pattern.
to make extra effort to build prior trust before making such transfers. In this
case, an escrow service, in which a buyer first transfers cryptocurrency into an
interim address owed by the market and the market later transfers the value on
to the vendor once the trade is finished, is provided by the marketplaces.
Conceptually, buyers, sellers, and the escrow service form a star-like sub-
graph, with the escrow address in the middle and edges pointing from the buyers
to the escrow and from the escrow to the sellers (Fig. 11a). The escrow nodes
naturally occupy the center of the transaction network. Popular darknet mar-
kets, such as SilkRoad, Agora, Wikispeed, and Evolution Market, ranked high
in transaction volume, degree, Eigenvector, PageRank [60, 65] and betweenness
centrality in the Type III Bitcoin network [66]. A high betweenness showed the
diversity of darknet marketplaces’ users because the market escrow nodes can
connect nodes in different communities. Identifying an escrow address chain
helps reveal market sale volume [129] or the sale of goods with particular prices
[130].
The tracing of escrow transactions has revealed the operation patterns of the
market escrow services. Similar to the situation in mining reward distribution,
the escrow address cannot transfer to an unlimited number of seller addresses
in a single transaction. Therefore, a tree-like distribution or a chain-like dis-
tribution was observed from escrow transaction histories [10]. For example, A
major chunk of the escrow is held in the escrow addresses, and payments to
the vendors first arrive in distribution addresses by a smaller amount and are
further forwarded to the sellers (see Fig. 11b).
Mixing serivces
Swapping-based mixing and CoinJoin-based mixing have distinct features in
the transaction records. Swapping services have high daily transaction numbers
[131] and transaction volumes [132], short active periods, and low balances [133].
In the short time of activation, swapping addresses tends to act as a transit
node, i.e., the middle node of a directed path of length 2, and rarely receives
more than one transaction from the same address [133]. Some swapping service
providers, such as Darklaunder, repeatedly use a single receiving address in a
short time [134], resulting in a larger degree of centrality than normal nodes
[132]. Moreover, since users who belong to different communities may use the
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same mixing service, mixing service nodes can also act as bridges to nodes with
few connections before mixings [135, 136].
By contrast, CoinJoin-based transactions resemble ordinary multiple-input-
multiple-output transactions. The average number of input addresses of Blockch-
ain.info’s SharedCoin mixing service transactions was 14.5 (between 4 and 40),
and the average number of output addresses was 25.8 (between 4 and 42) [137].
Structurally, these transactions can be well disguised among normal transactions
and lower the precision of address association rules in de-anonymizing Bitcoin
addresses. [138] estimated that the volume of CoinJoin transactions was about
2.5% of all Bitcoin transactions in June 2016.
A mixing service can also counter the taint analysis by making withdraw
transaction values have a lower variant than normal transactions, i.e., creating
similar outputs to prevent mixing re-identification [132, 139]. However, doing
so also makes the mixing transactions more recognizable in the transaction
network. [64] proposed an entropy measure to detect CoinJoin transactions in
Bitcoin transaction history. For a multiple-input-multiple-output transaction t,
its normalized input and output entropies
Hin,norm(t) =
Hin(t)
log2(kin(t))
,
Hout,norm(t) =
Hout(t)
log2(kout(t))
,
where k(t) is the degree of t, and Hin(t) is the absolute entropy of t, i.e.,
Hin(t) = −
∑
e∈Et,in
pe,inlog2pe,in,
Hout(t) = −
∑
e∈Et,out
pe,outlog2pe,out,
where pe,in and pe,out are the values transferred in and out, respectively, through
e, which is an incoming (outgoing) edge of t, normalized by the total number of
Bitcoin inputs (outputs). A high entropy corresponds to a uniform distribution
of bitcoin amounts in inputs (outputs) and indicates a potential mixing service.
Exchanges and wallets
Since the launch of BitcoinMarket.com on March 17, 2010 (now defunct),
cryptocurrency exchange activities occupied most of Bitcoin’s blockchain space.
The title of the largest exchange changed hands several times, e.g., Mt. Gox,
Poloniex, and Binance. Overall, it was estimated that 18% of the addresses
belonged to exchanges in Bitcoin transactions from 2009 to 2015 [63]. Network
nodes that belong to popular exchanges are highly ranked in degree [66, 75],
PageRank, betweenness, and closeness centralities in the transaction networks
[12, 60, 121].
Exchange nodes also have particular patterns of network connections. It was
found that in the Type I Bitcoin network, the middle node of a directed path
27
of length 2 that both starts and ends at an exchange address are highly likely
to be another exchange address, indicating that many inter-exchange Bitcoin
transactions occur [63]. However, those exchange addresses may not belong to
the same exchange [140].
Online wallets are like banks, accepting numerous deposits from users, and
initiating a large amount of withdraws to user addresses. Wallet addresses
ranked among the highest in degree, PageRank, and closeness centralities in
transaction networks [60, 66].
Games and Gamblings
Blockchain technology perfectly suits the need for casino games with a trans-
parent game logic, which can provide users with an extra source of trust in the
games than in traditional online casino games. Therefore, casino games are the
most popular applications on the blockchain.
SatoshiDICE, a simple fortune redistribution game, was the most popular
gambling game during 2012 and 2013, generating more than half of the trans-
action volume in the Bitcoin network [10]. Gambling transactions commonly
have identical volumes, e.g., USD 1 or 0.01 BTC, and consecutive transactions
between gambling services and players usually have short time intervals and
high intensity [131, 141]. Transaction network nodes belonging to SatoshiDICE
have a very high degree of centrality in both Type I and Type III Bitcoin net-
works [60, 66]. Other gambling services such as BTC Dice, BTCLucky, Clone
Dice, and DiceOnCrac also have very high degrees of centrality in the Type III
Bitcoin network [10].
Smart contract-based games have gained popularity in recent years. As the
most popular smart contract-based game, cryptokitties occupied caused a large
scale Ethereum traffic congestion and raised the volume of pending transactions
in the blockchain network from less than 1 000 to more than 10 000 at the end
of 2017 [142].
Market manipulation by whale addresses
The cryptocurrency secondary market was deemed to be highly inefficient. It
is commonly believed that cryptocurrencies have no price baseline and that the
volatility of the prices is mainly driven by the supply and demand of cryptocur-
rencies in the market [143]. Therefore, the change of majority in the numbers of
buyers and sellers may lead to price changes; that is, if more cryptocurrencies
are for sale, the prices drop, and vice versa [144]. [145] defined seller nodes in
the Type III Bitcoin network as those who accept Bitcoin (and sell goods) and
customer nodes as those who pay Bitcoin out. The customer to seller ratio has a
correlation coefficient of 0.44 to the Bitcoin price. Empirically, cryptocurrency
market prices were also found to be interactive with various assets, including
gold [146], the stock markets [147, 148, 149], and among different cryptocur-
rencies [150, 151, 152]. Prices were also found to be driven by social media
[153, 154, 155] and government regulations [156].
It is believed that some users who have preliminary information in the cryp-
tocurrency economy decide the market’s future movement [157, 158]. [159]
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traced hundreds of large Bitcoins transactions between 2018 and 2019 and found
a positive abnormal trading volume for the 15-minute window before these trans-
actions. [13] constructed daily Type III Bitcoin networks among the long-living
nodes and most active nodes during 2012 and 2013; they found that the singular
vector weights of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) analysis can explain the
fluctuation of Bitcoin prices to a large extent, e.g., 0.85 Pearson’s correlation.
[14] constructed a combination of Type I and Type II Bitcoins, i.e., using both
addresses and transactions as nodes in the transaction network. They consid-
ered each transaction a “chainlet,” which consisted of a central node, i.e., the
transaction, and several incoming and outgoing edges connected to addresses.
The number of particular chainlets, e.g., the number of input and output ad-
dresses > 20, showed Bitcoin prices’ predictive power.
A cryptocurrency exchange can also deliberately manipulate the supply and
demand inside itself. The leaked Mt. Gox internal transaction records showed
that one account bought USD 112 million worth of Bitcoins in a short 60-day
window during September and November 2013 and caused the Bitcoin price to
surge from lower than USD 200 to higher than USD 1 000 in two months [26].
The former managerial personnel later confirmed that the exchange operated
this account. [160] found that the transaction paths between the abnormal ac-
counts that traded with a significantly higher or lower price than the market
price formed many closed circles, i.e., self-loop, reciprocal edges, triangles, and
polygons. These patterns resulted in a high face transaction volume, yet little
actually changed hands. These patterns were also evidence of market manipula-
tion. Among the cryptocurrencies, the ones with small market capitalization, a
low traction volume, and trading in fewer exchanges were more prone to market
manipulation [161].
Ponzi scheme
Early Ponzi schemes in the cryptocurrency economy used Bitcoin as an in-
vestment target. Later, the invention of smart contracts boosted the schemes.
Since the HYIPs were written in codes and investment yields are automatically
distributed to the investors, investors would establish blind trust in these seem-
ingly transparent investment programs and ignore the possibility of dealing with
a Ponzi scheme [162].
Ponzi scheme addresses typically have lower transaction values, e.g., between
USD 0.01 and 0.1; higher transaction frequencies than normal addresses [163,
131]; and shorter average time span (37 days, as of 2014) than traditional offline
Ponzi schemes [162, 164]. However, frequent interactions between the scheme
organizers and end-users could prolong the active time [165]. The Gini coefficient
of yield distribution and the proportion of incoming transactions could also help
distinguish Ponzi scheme addresses from normal addresses [166, 162, 167].
5.4. Learning tasks using transaction features
Address identity inference
Address identity inference is a popular research topic in the cryptocurrency
transaction analysis. This task, with transaction tracing, are also collectively
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known as the de-anonymization of addresses. With addresses tags broadly avail-
able, supervised machine learning algorithms are applied to capture the differ-
ence between labeled samples with the transaction features mentioned above.
Considering that the extracted features can be both numerical and categor-
ical, the most commonly used classification algorithms are decision tree-based
algorithms, including plain decision tree (DT), classification and regression trees
(CART), gradient boosting-based decision trees (GBDT) (e.g., LightGBM, XG-
Boost), random forests (RF), and isolation forests (IF). Other commonly used
algorithms include logistic regression (LR), na¨ıve Bayes (NB), Bayes network
(BN), supporter vector machine (SVM), and neural network-based methods,
such as multilayer perceptron (MLP), long short-term memory (LSTM), convo-
lutional neural networks (CNN). Learning algorithms that take the transaction
network structure into account include graph convolution networks (GCN).
Identity inference tasks can be categorized into binary classification, e.g.,
mostly to identify whether an address is an illicit one (Table 1), and multi-class
classification for generic types of econimic agents (Table 2). The most significant
feature categories, best learning algorithms, and the best performances are also
marked with a bold font. Categories with a lower identification accuracy are
marked with bold font in the table.
Binary classification tasks generally achieve very high accuracy, showing
that illicit activities are highly separable in their transaction patterns. Com-
paratively, the accuracy of multiple classification tasks is significantly lower. In
particular, exchange nodes are commonly confused with gambling, the market-
place, and Ponzi schemes in Bitcoin networks. Feature-wise, transaction volume
features play essential roles in differentiating entities. Network structure-based
features, especially certain motifs such as loops, also help improve the predic-
tion power. Network embedded feature selection methods, when used alone,
can also achieve reasonable performance compared to hand-picked features. As
for learning algorithms, decision tree-based methods, especially random forests,
achieved the highest performance in most of the tasks. GNN based methods,
despite their novelty and popularity in recent literature, did not show superior
prediction power to well-established methods.
The class imbalance problem is severe in the classification tasks, especially
those involving illicit addresses. For example, fraudulent addresses are ex-
tremely difficult to obtain, while exchange and wallet addresses are abundant.
Common solutions fall into two categories. Sampling-based methods, including
the under-sampling of the large class [163] and synthetic minority over-sampling
(SMOTE) technique [176], attempt to balance the number of samples in different
classes. However, cost function-based methods can impose extra punishment to
wrongly classified small class samples [166, 169]. Cross-validation and ensemble
learning methods were applied to minimize the lack of samples in small classes.
Prices prediction
Table 3 summarizes the representative works of using transaction network
features to predict cryptocurrency prices. Mean squared error (MSE), and
root mean squared error (RMSE) are commonly used as precision indicators.
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Table 1: A summary of binary supervised learning tasks
Research Cryptocurrency Target/Classes Features Best algorithm Performance
[63] Bitcoin Exchange Volume, neighbor identity RF 1.0 F1
[166] Bitcoin Ponzi scheme Volume, temporal RF 31 out of 32, 1% FPR
[163] Bitcoin Ponzi scheme Volume, temporal, motif RF 95% TPR, 5% FPR
[114] Bitcoin Illicit transactions Volume, neighbor’s volume, embedding EvolveGCN 0.97 F1
[168] Bitcoin Illicit transactions Volume RF 0.98 F1
[132] Bitcoin Laundering Embedding (25 dimensions) Adaboost 0.94 F1
[132] Bitcoin Laundering Volume, temporal, neighbours, embedding Adaboost 0.93 F1
[114] Bitcoin Laundering Volume, temporal RF 0.76 F1
[138] Ethereum Illicit Volume, temporal XGBoost 0.99 AUC
[169] Ethereum Fraudulent Volume, temporal RF 0.48 F1
[92] Ethereum Ponzi scheme Volume, temporal, contract code J48 0.97 F1
[170] Ethereum Ponzi scheme contract code RF 0.79 F1
[171] Ethereum Malicious addresses Volume, temporal RF 47 out of 50
[112] Ethereum Phishing scams Embedding SVM 0.91 F1
F1: F1 score; TPR: true positive rate; FPR: false positive rate; AUC: area under curve.
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Table 2: A summary of multi-class supervised learning tasks
Research Cryptocurrency Target/Classes Features Best algorithm Performance
[172] Bitcoin Exchange, gambling, service, and general Embedding (8 dimensions) DT 0.91 F1
[173] Bitcoin Exchange, service, gambling, mining Pool, mixer,
and marketplace
volume, motif feature cascading model 99.7% accuracy
[174] Bitcoin Mining pools, miners, mixing services, gambling,
exchanges and others
Volume, temporal, embed-
ding
RF 0.96 F1
[131] Bitcoin Exchange/wallet, faucet offering, gambling,
HYIP, marketplace escrow, mining pool, mixer
Volume, temporal, motif RF 72% accuracy
[175] Bitcoin Exchange, faucet, gambling, HYIP, market,
mixer, mining pool
Volume, temporal, motif GBDT, NN 0.86 Macro F1
[140] Bitcoin Exchange, service, gambling, mining pool, dark-
net marketplace
Volume, temporal, central-
ity, motif
GBDT 0.91 F1
[176] Bitcoin Exchange, hosted-wallet, personal-wallet, darknet
marketplace, gambling, merchant-services, mining-
pool, mixing, ransomware, scam, stolen-bitcoins,
others
Volume, temporal, neigh-
bor identity
Extra Trees 96% accuracy
[116] Ethereum 1071 smart contract authors Stylometrics RF 91% accuracy using
source code, 80% accu-
racy using byte code
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The prediction results across different works may be incomparable as MSE and
RMSE are sensitive to the cryptocurrency price scales. Nevertheless, it can be
learned that network structural features, including both macroscopic properties,
such as size and density, and microscopic properties, such as centrality measures
of and motifs around nodes, can provide predictive power for the cryptocurrency
price and price direction, e.g., achieving larger than 50% accuracy, in the next
time window. The predictive power of transaction network structural properties
is also solid proof that the cryptocurrency market is highly inefficient.
Anomaly detection
Bot activities, malicious attacks, and rare anomalous activities can also leave
marks in the transaction records. However, the number of instances is too
small to guarantee good classification performance in supervised learning tasks.
Therefore, rule-based or unsupervised learning algorithms are used to identify
outlier addresses in search for anomalous activities. The learning algorithms
used are k-means, kd-tree, unsupervised SVM, Isolation Forest (IF), Gaussian
Mixture Models (GMM), and a Role eXtraction (RolX) algorithm, which fac-
torizes the feature matrix into two non-negative matrices and categorizes the
nodes into clusters where smaller ones are considered anomalous [183]. A sum-
mary of transaction network anomaly detection methods and results can be
found in Table 4. Addresses with anomalous transaction patterns provide very
strong predictive power to illicit activities such as the Ponzi schemes, thefts,
and malicious attacks to the blockchain or cryptocurrency services.
6. Tools for Analyzing and Visualizing Transactions
Part of the literature reviewed in the main text posted relevant codes or
tools online. This section provides non-exhaustive lists of the analytics and
visualization tools, as well as blockchain data analysis websites and services.
6.1. ETL tools
ETL tools extract information such as scripts, transactions, address bal-
ances, smart contract codes, and their current states from the blockchain, and
feed the information into SQL, Graph, or NoSQL databases. ETL is the es-
sential step before conducting a cryptocurrency transaction network analysis.
Some tools ship with additional analytic features. Table 5 provides a list of ETL
tools collected from the literature and online.
6.2. Visualization tools
Visual analysis is also a powerful tool in network analysis. Table 6 summa-
rizes the visualization tools that can construct transaction networks and provide
visual analytic functions.
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Table 3: A summary of cryptocurrency prices prediction tasks
Research Cryptocurrency Target Features Methods Best performance
[177] Bitcoin Price direction Network size and density, mining dif-
ficulty, market information
RF, SVM, LR 99% accuracy in daily direction,
50%–55% accuracy in 10-minute di-
rection
[144] Bitcoin Price and direction Network size and density; volume
features of the three most influential
nodes
LR, SVM, NN, Liner
Regression
MSE 1.94; 55% accuracy in price
change direction
[178] Bitcoin Price direction Market information, network size
and density, PageRank, and be-
tweenness centralities
RF Accuracy increased from 60% to 74%
using centrality features
[179] Bitcoin, Litecoin Price and return Motif features, market information RF Motif features contribute to the pre-
diction of price and return
[180] Bitcoin Price direction Volume of the most frequently
traded edges, market information
NN 60% accuracy
[181] Bitcoin Price direction Volume features, centrality features
of the most influential nodes, market
information
GBDT, SVM, DT 82% accuracy
[182] Ethereum Price Network size and density, distri-
bution of node features, market
information
LSTM, CNN Four times the error reduction with
transaction network features than
with only market information
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Table 4: A summary of unsupervised learning-based anomaly detection
Research Cryptocurrency Features Learning algorithms Outcome
[184] Bitcoin Volume, motif kd-tree Found 12 out of 30 known fraudsters
[89] Bitcoin Volume, motif k-means, unsupervised SVM Found 2 out of 30 known theft cases
[185] Bitcoin Volume RolX Conjectured mixing service clusters
[186] Bitcoin Network Visual inspection Hidden communities about hundreds of users
[187] Bitcoin Volume, mining PCA and visual analysis Detected Pirate@40’s HYIP scheme
[188] Bitcoin Volume, temporal SVM 15 out of 16 known attacks
[12] Ethereum Volume, temporal Threshold Malicious attacks detected
[189] Ripple Volume, temporal IF, SVM, GMM Bank fund movements, arbitrage bots, dumping
3
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6.3. Online intelligence platforms
Online intelligence platforms are websites that provide in-depth blockchain
information. Some platforms also allow users to post crowd-sourced knowl-
edge to their databases. These intelligence platforms include Blockchain.info
(now called Blockchain.com) [2], Etherscan [3], WalletExplorer [103], and Block-
Cypher [190]. Technology companies such as Chainalysis [105] and Elliptic [104]
also provide comprehensive services in cryptocurrency data analytics and mali-
cious activity monitoring.
7. Open problems
Despite the fruitful findings in the existing works, knowledge discovery stud-
ies from cryptocurrency transactions can advance in both methodology and the
research questions.
Network representation learning
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the cryptocurrency transaction net-
works are the largest networks that could be built from public data sources,
with evolving network structures and abundant labels on the nodes and edges,
providing much information for the knowledge discovery in transaction records.
The state-of-the-art methodology in network analysis is network representation
learning. Although this method has been used in recognizing user identities in
the transaction networks, it is still out-performed by the traditional decision
tree-based method in simple binary classification tasks [114]. Therefore, we be-
lieve that there is still considerable room for further development and applica-
tion of network representation learning techniques in cryptocurrency transaction
analysis.
Tracing across ledgers
From the cryptocurrency economic perspective, transactions across different
ledgers are potentially intertwined, as users often change their holdings of one
cryptocurrency to another. The linkage between different cryptocurrencies can
be studied from several perspectives. For example, the transactions that hap-
pened inside cryptocurrency exchanges [215] and on exchange-like blockchain
ledgers, such as Ripple [216], can both be utilized further to trace the flow of
monetary flow between users regardless of the actual currency used. Recently
proposed cryptocurrency blockchain systems, e.g., Polkadot, also provide “in-
teroperability” across different ledgers. In such a design, the transaction records
of an amount of cryptocurrency can be “locked” on one blockchain and recorded
on another. The study of multiple blockchain ledger integrations is just starting.
There is no doubt that current methods can partially solve these questions, but
many open questions remain, e.g., how to integrate multiple pieces of transac-
tion histories, trace transactions among different cryptocurrencies, and detect
illicit activities from these transactions.
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Table 5: List of blockchain data ETL tools
Tool Cryptocurrency Computer
language
Database Additional features
BitIodine [191] Bitcoin Python Neo4j address clustering and classification
Blockchain2graph [192] Bitcoin Java/typescript Neo4j Graph query with Cipher language
BlockSci [193] Bitcoin, Litecoin, Name-
coin, Zcash
C++/Python in memory MapReduce computation
BTCSpark [194] Bitcoin Cython SQL
bitcoin-blockchain-parser [195] Bitcoin Python Local files Supports SegWit
BlockETL [196] Bitcoin Java SQL
Blockparser [197] Bitcoin C++ in memory Simple blockchain statistics: the closure of an
address, all the block rewards and fees, taint
analysis, etc.
rusty-blockparser [198] Bitcoin, Litecoin, Name-
coin, Dogecoin, Myriad-
coin, Unobtanium
Rust csv files, MySQL Simple blockchain statistics: average transac-
tions per block, largest transactions, transac-
tion types, etc.
Btctrackr [199] Bitcoin C++ MySQL Address clustering based on multiple inputs
rule
BitcoinUses [200] Bitcoin Java/Javascript Hadoop MapReduce computation
Blockchain-etl [201] Bitcoin, Litecoin,
Ethereum, Zcash, Dash,
Dogecoin, Bitcoin Cash
Python csv files, BigQuery
BlockchainVis [202] Bitcoin N/A Accumulo address clustering, mixing identification, and
visualization
Ether sql [203] Ethereum Python SQL
BlockAPI [204] Bitcoin, Ethereum Scala MongoDB, MySQL, Post-
greSQL, Fuseki
External data: exchange rates, address tags,
protocol identifiers, etc.
EtherQL [205] Ethereum Java MongoDB Support range query and top-k query
DataEther [206] Ethereum N/A ElasticSearch Ethereum account balance, transaction trac-
ing, contract analysis
TokenScope [207] Ethereum N/A N/A Detecting inconsistent token behaviors with
regard to ERC20 token standards
TEETHER [208] Ethereum N/A N/A creating exploits for smart contracts
Erays [209] Ethereum N/A N/A reverse engineering tool for smart contracts
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Table 6: List of cryptocurrency transaction network visual analytic tools
Tool Cryptocurrency Computer language database
BitConeView [210] Bitcoin Python N/A
BitExTract [211] Bitcoin Python MangoDB
BiVA [212] Bitcoin Python Neo4j
SuPoolVisor [213] Bitcoin interactive visual analytics and
surveillance of mining pools
N/A
goBlockchainDataAnalysis [214] Faircoin Go, NodeJS, AngularJS MongoDB
New tokens standards
More than 300 000 user-customized tokens have been issued on the Ethereum
blockchain as of 2020, following the ERC20, ERC721, and ERC777 standards.
ERC20 is the initial version of the token standard, ERC777 is an update to
ERC20, and ERC721 is fundamentally different. ERC20 and ERC777 tokens
are fungible, which means that each token can have a certain amount of distri-
bution, and proportions of the whole amount can circulate among blockchain
addresses independently. Comparatively, ERC721 tokens are designed to repre-
sent ownership over digital or physical assets. They are non-fungible, meaning
that each token is of only one instance and cannot be further divided. Fun-
gible and non-fungible tokens can have a distinct nature of circulation. What
are the most distinct characteristics between the two types of networks? What
can the distinction tell about user behaviors? Such questions are worth further
investigation.
Primary market activities
Some user-customized tokens issued on the blockchains are classified as secu-
rities by government regulatory bodies [217]. Companies and start-up projects
raise funds by selling tokens to institutional and individual investors. This fund-
ing method, which bears the names of ICO, IEO, and security token offering
(STO), is much like conventional primary market activities. However, because
of the lack of regulation to this funding method in most parts of the world,
fraud and scams frequently happen and often lead to investors’ huge losses. A
study of economy agent behavior in the funding process could help reveal the
financial misconduct of token issuers and distributors, hence better protecting
individual investors’ interests.
De-Fi
The development of smart contract-based financial instruments and the in-
creasing adoption of blockchain technology in investors have brought a new
wave of cryptocurrency innovation — De-Fi. Short for decentralized financing,
an umbrella term for the whole spectrum of financial activities over blockchain,
De-Fi aims to disrupt and automate the entire financial industry. For example,
users can deposit a digital asset into a smart contract as collateral for a loan
of another digital asset. Other decentralized financial services, such as trading,
lending, investment, asset management, and insurance, are also being developed.
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With all the transaction and usage history recorded on the blockchain ledgers,
a thorough study of human financial behaviors based on an unprecedented rich
dataset can be anticipated.
Digital fiat money
The knowledge revealed by the transaction data stored in the blockchain
networks not only helps to demonstrate the validity of the claim that the trans-
parency of blockchain could facilitate auditing and regulating user activities, but
could also be applied to a broader area beyond blockchain. Year 2020 sees the
pilot tests and promotions of digital fiat money, such as Sweden’s E-Krona and
China’s digital currency electronic payment (DC/EP). Although not necessarily
adopting blockchain systems, the transaction records of these electronic versions
of fiat money will be fully archived, e.g., in a central database. The successful
experience of cryptocurrency transaction network analysis can be further bor-
rowed by the electronic fiat money system in the future to help governments
fight against bribing, money laundering, and terrorism financing.
8. Conclusion
Since the invention of Bitcoin in 2008, cryptocurrency has received wide ac-
ceptance among millions of users worldwide. A complete trace of users’ activities
and behaviors has been faithfully recorded on the blockchain. Having begun to
notice the richness of the blockchain database a few years ago, academia has
since produced a large body of research regarding cryptocurrency transactions.
The most extensively studied cryptocurrencies are Bitcoin, Ethereum, user-
customized tokens issued on the Ethereum blockchain, and altcoins that pro-
vide extra privacy-preserving functions. Bitcoin is the representative cryptocur-
rency using a UTXO data model to store their transactions, while the Ethereum
blockchain is the representative account-based data model.
Attributed to the transparency of blockchain ledgers, most of the cryptocur-
rency transactions are traceable and linkable. Although various coin mixing
services and privacy-enhancing alternative cryptocurrencies are proposed, Care-
less use still can largely reveal user identity and behaviors. The tracing of illicit
money flows between Ponzi scheme organizers and their victims, thefts, laun-
dering, and ransomware victims have also provided strong evidence for solving
these crimes.
From a macroscopic view, the cryptocurrency transactions among blockchain
accounts form large and complex transaction networks. These networks are
continually growing, with new blockchain addresses being created and used.
Preferential attachment is the principal law governing the networks’ growth:
new nodes connect to existing nodes with higher connectivity. The networks
eventually evolved into scale-free, e.g., with power-law degree distributions, and
small-world networks, e.g., with short average path lengths and high clustering
coefficients. The transaction networks can also show a bow-tie structure, with a
large strongly connected component and obvious source and sink communities.
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Agents in the cryptocurrency economy may have different economic behav-
iors and therefore form different transaction patterns. For example, mining
pools send rewards to pool members in a tree-like or chain-like series of trans-
actions. Marketplaces also use such distribution patterns to conduct their es-
crow services. Major agents such as cryptocurrency exchanges, online wallets,
marketplaces, gambling games, and mixing services were all found to have the
highest transaction volumes and possess transaction networks’ central positions.
These structural features can be further utilized in machine learning algorithms
to derive models that differentiate and identify economic agents in the transac-
tion network.
With the cryptocurrency economy booming in recent years, we can foresee
an abundance of new and disruptive innovations, especially blockchain-enabled
financial services. We believe that cryptocurrency transactions will continu-
ously provide new knowledge of various human social-economic behaviors in the
future.
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